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AN OUTLINE OF THE BAYESIAN DECISION THEORY
H.R.N. VAN ERP, R.O. LINGER, AND P.H.A.J.M. VAN GELDER
Abstract. In this fact sheet we give an outline on the Bayesian Decision
Theory.
1. Introduction
The Bayesian decision theory is very simple in structure. Its algorithmic steps
are the following:
(1) Use the product and sum rules of Bayesian probability theory to construct
outcome probability distributions.
(2) If our outcomes are monetary in nature, then by way of the Bernoulli utility
function we may map utilities to the monetary outcomes of our outcome
probability distributions.
(3) Maximize the position of the resulting utility probability distributions.
This is the whole of the Bayesian decision theory.
2. Constructing Outcome Probability Distributions
In the Bayesian decision theory each problem of choice is understood to consist
of a set of decisions from which we must choose. Each possible decision has as-
sociated with it its own set of possible outcomes, and each outcome has its own
plausibility of occurring relative to the other outcomes under that same decision.
Stated differently, each decision in our problem of choice admits its own outcome
probability distribution.
In its most abstract form, we have that each problem of choice consists of a set
of potential decisions
Di = {D1, . . . , Dn} .
Each decision Di we make may give rise to a set of possible events
Eji = {E1i , . . . , Emi} .
These events Eji are associated with the decisions Di by way of the conditional
probabilities P (Eji |Di). Furthermore, each event Eji allows for a set of potential
outcomes
Okji =
{
O1ji , . . . , Olji
}
.
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These outcomes Okji are associated with the events Eji by way of the conditional
probabilities P
(
Okji
∣∣Eji).
By way of the product rule [5], we compute the bivariate probability distribution
of an event and an outcome conditional on the decision taken:
P
(
Eji , Okji
∣∣Di) = P (Eji |Di)P (Okji
∣∣Eji) . (2.1)
The outcome probability distribution is then obtained by marginalizing, by way of
the sum rule [5], over all the possible events:
P
(
Okji
∣∣Di) =
mi∑
ji=1
P
(
Eji , Okji
∣∣Di) . (2.2)
The outcome probability distributions (2.2), for i = 1, . . . , n, are the information
carriers which represent our state of knowledge in regards to the objective conse-
quences of our decisions.
3. A Consistency Proof of the Bernoulli Utility Function
We will now derive the Bernoulli utility function, or, equivalently, the Weber-
Fechner law, or, equivalently, in content, Steven’s Power law, using the desiderata
of invariance and consistency. In this we follow a venerable Bayesian tradition,
[2, 5, 7].
Say, we have the positive quantities x, y, and z, of some stimulus or commodity
of interest. Then these quantities, being numbers on the positive real, admit an
ordering. So, let quantities be ordered as x ≤ y ≤ z. We now want to find the
function f that quantifies the perceived decrease associated with going from, say,
the quantity z to the quantity x.
The first functional equation is based on the desideratum that the unknown
function f should be invariant for a change of scale in our quantities:
f(x, z) = f(cx, cz) , (3.1)
where c is positive constant.
For example, if our quantities concern sums of money, then the perceived loss
of going from ten dollars to one dollar should be the same perceived loss if we
reformulate this scenario in dollar cents.
The second functional equation is based on the desideratum of consistency, in
which we state that the perceived decrease in going directly from z to x, ought to
be the same perceived decrease in going from z to x via y:
f(x, z) = g[f(x, y) , f(y, z)] . (3.2)
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For example, if our quantities concern sums of money, then the perceived loss of
going from ten dollars to one dollar should be the same perceived loss if we first go
from ten dollars to five dollars, and then from five dollars to one dollar; seeing that
in both scenarios we start out with an initial wealth of ten dollars, only to end up
with a current wealth of one dollar.
The general solution to (3.1) is [3]:
f(x, y) = h
(
x
y
)
, (3.3)
were h is some arbitrary function.The general solution to (3.2) is [7]:
Θ[f(x, z)] = Θ[f(x, y)] + Θ[f(y, z)] , (3.4)
where Θ is some arbitrary monotonic function. Moreover, because of this arbitrari-
ness, we may define Θ as [7]:
Θ(x) = logΨ(x) . (3.5)
Using (3.5), we may rewrite (3.4), without any loss of generality, as
logΨ[f(x, z)] = logΨ[f(x, y)] + logΨ[f(y, z)] , (3.6)
or, equivalently,
Ψ[f(x, z)] = Ψ[f(x, y)] Ψ[f(y, z)] . (3.7)
Substituting (3.3) into (3.4) and (3.7) and letting, respectively,
θ
(
x
y
)
= Θ
[
h
(
x
y
)]
, (3.8)
and
ψ
(
x
y
)
= Ψ
[
h
(
x
y
)]
, (3.9)
we obtain the equivalent functional equations:
θ
(x
z
)
= θ
(
x
y
)
+ θ
(y
z
)
(3.10)
and
ψ
(x
z
)
= ψ
(
x
y
)
ψ
(y
z
)
. (3.11)
If we assume differentiability, then (3.10), together with the two boundary con-
ditions:
f(x, x) = θ
(x
x
)
= 0, (3.12)
and
f(x, y) = θ
(
x
y
)
< 0, for x < y, (3.13)
is sufficient to find the function f that quantifies the perceived decrease associated
with going from the quantity y to the quantity x.
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This function θ turns out to be Bernoulli’s utility function, or, equivalently, the
Weber-Fechner law of sense perception:
f(x, y) = q log
x
y
, q ≥ 0 (3.14)
where y is our initial asset position and x is the final asset position, and q is some
arbitrary constant which has to be obtained by way psychological experimentation.
So, Bernoulli’s utility function (3.14) is the only function that adheres to the
desiderata of unit invariance and consistency, respectively, (3.1) and (3.2), and the
boundary conditions that a zero change should lead to a zero perceived loss and that
a perceived loss should be assigned a negative value, respectively, (3.12) and (3.13).
Any other utility function will be in violation with these fundamental desiderata
and specific boundary conditions.
Note that Fechner re-derived (3.14) in 1860 as the law that guides our sensory
perception. In the years that followed (3.14) proved to be so successful, as it,
amongst other things, gave rise to our decibel scale, that it established psychol-
ogy as a legitimate experimental science [4]. But as Fechner was very careful, for
metaphysical reasons, or so we hazard to guess [3], to apply his Weber law, which
later became the Fechner-Weber law, only to non-monetary stimuli, the implied
universality of (3.14) was not recognized for the longest time.
However, because of the here given consistency derivation of (3.14), it is now
shown that the Fechner-Weber, or, equivalently, Bernoulli’s utility function, is one
of the consistent functions that quantifies the distance between x and y; thus,
explaining the universal applicability of Bernoulli’s utility function.
The other consistent distance function is Steven’s power law, which may be
derived as follows. If we assume differentiability, then (3.11), together with the two
boundary conditions:
f(x, x) = ψ
(x
x
)
= 1, (3.15)
and
0 < f(x, y) = ψ
(
x
y
)
< 1, for x < y, (3.16)
is sufficient to find the function f that quantifies the perceived decrease associated
with going from the quantity y to the quantity x.
This function f turns out to be Steven’s power law:
f(x, y) =
(
x
y
)q
, q ≥ 0. (3.17)
where y is our initial asset position and x is the final asset position, and q is some
arbitrary constant which has to be obtained by way psychological experimentation.
So, Steven’s power law (3.17) is the only function that adheres to the desiderata
of unit invariance and consistency, respectively, (3.1) and (3.2), and the boundary
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conditions that a zero change should lead to a ratio of one between the initial and
final ‘asset position’ and that a perceived loss should be assigned a value smaller
than 1, respectively, (3.15) and (3.16). Any other utility function will be in violation
with these fundamental desiderata and specific boundary conditions.
We summarize, given the desiderata (3.1) and (3.2), the Fechner-Weber law
(3.14) results from the boundary condition that negative increments result negative
utilities and a zero increment results in an utility of zero, (3.12) and (3.13); whereas
Steven’s power law (3.17) results from the boundary condition that utilities must
be greater than zero and that a zero increment results an utility of one, (3.15) and
(3.16).
Stated differently, the Fechner-Weber law and Steven’s power law are both equiv-
alent in content, differing only in the proposed utility scale. A subtlety that
seems to have been overlooked by some, seeing that the Fechner-Weber law ver-
sus the Steven’s power law has been a source of controversy in psycho-physical
community[8].
4. The Criterion Of Choice as a Degree of Freedom
Let D1 and D2 be two decisions we have to choose from. Let oi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
and oj , for j = 1, . . . ,m, be the monetary outcomes associated with, respectively,
decisions D1 and D2. Then in the Bayesian decision theory we first construct the
two outcome distributions that correspond with these decisions:
p(oi|D1) , p(oj |D2) , (4.1)
where, if n = m, the outcomes oi and oj may or not may be equal for i = j.
We then proceed, by way of the Bernoulli utility function (3.14), or, equivalently,
the Weber-Fechner law, to map utilities to the monetary outcomes oi and oj in (4.1).
This leaves us with the utility probability distributions:
p(ui|D1) , p(uj |D2) . (4.2)
Now, our most primitive intuition regarding the utility probability distributions
(4.2) is that the decision which corresponds with the utility probability distribution
which lies more to the right will also be the decision that promises to be the most
advantageous. So, when making a decision we ought to compare the positions of
the utility probability distributions on the utility axis and then choose that decision
which maximizes the position of these utility probability distributions.
This all sounds intuitive enough. But how do we define the position of a prob-
ability distribution? Ideally we would have some consistency derivation of what
constitutes a position measure of a probability distribution, say,
Hn(p1, . . . , pn, x1, . . . , xn) (4.3)
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where pi are the probabilities of the values xi, for i = 1, . . . , n. But in the absence
of such a consistency derivation we have to take our recourse to ad hoc common
sense considerations. Stated differently, the criterion of choice in our decision theory
constitutes a degree of freedom.
4.1. The Expectation Value as a Position Measure. From the introduction
of expected outcome theory in the 17th century and expected utility theory in the
18th century the implicit assumption has been that the measure of a position of a
probability distribution is given by its expectation value [5, 1]:
E(X) =
n∑
i=1
pixi = Hn(p1, . . . , pn, x1, . . . , xn.) (4.4)
But this criterion of choice has proven to be so unsatisfactory that it has given
rise to the paradigm of behavioral economics which holds as its central tenet that
human decision making does not adhere to the maximization of expectation values
[6]. So, we set out to search for a more appropriate criterion of choice.
4.2. The Confidence Bounds as a Position Measure. Now we may imagine a
decision problem in which we are only interested in the positions of the probabilistic
worst or best case scenarios.
The absolute worst case scenario is:
a = min(x1, . . . , xn) . (4.5)
The criterion of choice (4.5) is also known as the maximin criterion of choice.
The k-sigma lower bound of a given probability distribution is a given as
LB(X) = E(X)− k std(X) , (4.6)
where
std(X) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
pi [xi − E(X)]
2, (4.7)
and where k is the sigma level of the lower bound. The probabilistic worst case
scenario then is given as:
LB∗(X) =


E(X)− k std(X) , LB(X) > a,
a, LB(X) ≤ a.
(4.8)
So, we have that the probabilistic worst case scenario holds the maximin criterion
of choice as a special case.
The absolute best case scenario is:
b = max(x1, . . . , xn) . (4.9)
The criterion of choice (4.9) is also known as the maximax criterion of choice.
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The k-sigma upper bound of a given probability distribution is a given as:
UB(X) = E(X) + k std(X) , (4.10)
where k is the sigma level of the upper bound. The probabilistic best case scenario
then is given as:
UB∗(X) =


E(X) + k std(X) , UB(X) < b,
b, UB(X) ≥ b.
(4.11)
So, we have that the probabilistic best case scenario holds the maximax criterion
of choice as a special case.
If we take as our criterion of choice (4.8) then we only endeavor to minimize
our ‘losses’ and if we take as our criterion of choice (4.11) then we only endeavor
to maximize our ‘gains’. A more rational, that is, balanced, criterion of choice
would be to make a trade-off between the losses/gains in the probabilistic worst
case scenarios (4.8) and the corresponding gains/losses in the probabilistic best
case scenarios (4.11).
4.3. The Sum of Confidence Bounds as a Position Measure. If we take as
our criterion of choice
LB∗(X) + UB∗(X)
2
=


E(X) , LB(X) > a,UB(X) < b,
a+E(X)+k std(X)
2 , LB(X) ≤ a, UB(X) < b,
E(X)−k std(X)+b
2 , LB(X) > a,UB(X) ≥ b,
a+b
2 , LB(X) ≤ a, UB(X) ≥ b,
(4.12)
then we have a position measure which makes a trade-off between the losses/gains
in the probabilistic worst case scenarios (4.8) and the corresponding gains/losses in
the probabilistic best case scenarios (4.11); see Appendix A.
This alternative position measure, as an added benefit, also holds the traditional
criterion of choice (4.4) as a special case, when no undershoot and overshoot of,
respectively, the lower and upper sigma confidence bounds occur, as well as Hur-
witz’s criterion of choice with a balanced pessimism factor of c = 1/2, when both an
undershoot and an overshoot occur. Nonetheless, it may be found that the criterion
of choice (4.12) is vulnerable to a simple counter-example.
Imagine two utility probability distributions having equal lower and upper bounds,
but one being right-skewed and the other being left-skewed. Then the criterion of
choice (4.12) will leave us undecided between the two, whereas our intuition would
give preference to the decision corresponding with the left-skewed distribution, as
the bulk of the probability distribution of the left-skewed distribution will be more
to the right than that of the right-skewed distribution.
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4.4. The Sum of Confidence Bounds Plus the Expectation Value as a Po-
sition Measure. What we seek to maximize in our decision theory is the position
of the utility probability distributions; as we have that the decision that puts our
utility probability distribution most to the right promises to be the most profitable
decision. In this there is little room for maneuvering. But in our choice of the
measure that captures the position of a given probability distribution there is all
the more.
Taking a cue from the behavioral economists we have derived as an alternative
to (4.4) the criterion of choice (4.12) that also takes into account the standard
deviation of a given probability distributions, by way of the positions of the under
and overshoot corrected lower and upper bounds. But only to find its universality
compromised by the simple counter example of a right-skewed and a left-skewed
distribution which have the same lower and upper bounds.
Now, also taking a cue from the intuitive results which flow forth from (4.12) [3],
we may ‘repair’ our criterion of choice (4.12), albeit in an ad hoc fashion, by taking
as our position measure for a probability distribution the weighted sum:
LB∗(u) + E(u) + UB∗(u)
3
=


E(X) , LB(X) > a,UB(X) < b,
a+2E(X)+k std(X)
3 , LB(X) ≤ a, UB(X) < b,
2E(X)−k std(X)+b
3 , LB(X) > a,UB(X) ≥ b,
a+E(X)+b
3 , LB(X) ≤ a, UB(X) ≥ b,
(4.13)
For in this criterion of choice we not only take into account the trade-off between
the probabilistic worst and best case scenarios, but also the location of the bulk
of the probability density in a uni-model probability distribution; thus, accommo-
dating the intuitive preference for the left-skewed distribution of the above counter
example.
The position measure (4.13) is the weighted sum of the positions of, respectively,
the probabilistic worst, expected, and best case. The uncorrected lower and upper
bounds, (4.6) and (4.10), have been traditionally used as simplifying proxies for
their generating probability distributions, by way of confidence intervals:
[LB(X) , UB(X)] . (4.14)
We, alternatively, take as our simplifying proxy the corrected lower and upper
bounds, (4.8) and (4.11), and the expectation value (4.4):
[LB∗(X) , E(X) , UB∗(X)] . (4.15)
Because of the corrections for lower bound undershoot and upper bound overshoot
in (4.15) we have that for skewed distributions the distance between E(X) and
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LB∗(X) may differ from the distance between UB∗(X) and E(X); thus, reflecting
the asymmetry present in these distributions.
The position of the generating probability distribution then is taken to be the
weighted sum of the positions of the elements of our simple proxy distribution. This
then is the rationale behind the criterion of choice (4.13).
5. Discussion
It may be read in Jaynes’ [5], that to the best of his knowledge, there are as of
yet no formal principles at all for assigning numerical values to loss functions; not
even when the criterion is purely economic, because the utility of money remains
ill-defined. In the absence of these formal principles, Jaynes final verdict was that
decision theory can not be fundamental.
The Bernoulli utility function, initially derived by Bernoulli, by way of common
sense first principles [1], has now been derived by way of a consistency argument.
This consistency argument explains why it is that Bernoulli’s utility function, both
in its original Fechner-Weber law and in its alternative Steven’s power law form, has
proven to be so ubiquitous and successful the field of sensory perception research;
simply because human sense perception, like the laws of Nature, adheres to the
desideratum of consistency.
The history of Bayesian probability theory has taught us that the usefulness of
a theory, in terms of its practical and beautifully intuitive results, in the absence of
a compelling axiomatic basis, provides no safeguard against attacks by those who
choose to close their eyes to this usefulness. This is why we felt compelled to search
for a consistency derivation of the Bernoulli utility function.
Now, having presented a consistency proof for the Bernoulli utility function, the
question now is: Is the Bayesian decision theory, just like the Bayesian probability
and information theories, Bayesian in the strictest sense in the word, or, equiva-
lently, an inescapable consequence of the desideratum of consistency? We will now
try to answer this question.
The first two algorithmic steps of the Bayesian decision theory, respectively, the
construction of outcome probability distributions by way of the Bayesian probabil-
ity theory and the construction of utility probability distributions by way of the
Bernoulli utility function, allow us no freedom.
To construct our outcome and utility probability distributions otherwise, would
be to invite inconsistency. But there is one degree of freedom remaining in the
Bayesian decision theory as a whole. This remaining degree of freedom lies in the
choice of our position measure of a given probability distribution.
In any problem of choice we will endeavor to choose that decision which has a
corresponding utility probability distribution that is lying most the right on the
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utility axis; that is, we will choose to maximize our utility probability distributions.
In this there is little freedom. But we are free, in principle, to choose the measures of
the positions of our utility probability distributions any way we see fit. Nonetheless,
we believe that it is always a good policy to take into account all the pertinent
information we have.
If we only maximize the expectation values of the utility probability distributions,
then we will, by definition, neglect the information that the standard deviations of
the utility probability distributions have to bear on our problem of choice, by way
of the symmetry breaking in the case of an overshoot of one of the bounds.
Likewise, we are free to only maximize one of the confidence bounds of our
utility probability distributions, while neglecting the other. But in doing so, we
will be performing probabilistic maximin or maximax analyses, and, consequently,
neglect the possibility of either the (catastrophic) losses in the lower bound or the
(astronomical) gains in the upper bound.
However, if we only maximize the sum of the lower and upper bound, or a scalar
multiple thereof, then we will make a trade-off between the probabilistic worst and
best case scenarios. But in the process, we will, for uni-modal distributions, be
neglecting the location of the bulk of our probability distributions.
This is why, in our minds, the scalar multiple the sum of the lower bound, ex-
pectation value, and upper bound currently is the most all-round position measure
for a given probability distribution, as it reflects the position of the probabilistic
worst and best case scenarios, as well as the position of the expected outcome.
Having removed the degree of freedom of the utility function by way of a con-
sistency derivation, we now should endeavor to find a like consistency derivation
of the measure of the position of a given probability distribution (4.3); as such a
consistency derivation would make the Bayesian decision theory incontestable.
But until that time, we will have to do with the kind of simplistic common sense
reasoning that led us from the traditional position measure (4.4), to the position
measures (4.12) and (4.13), and make the disclaimer that our adopted criterion of
choice, as a degree of freedom, is just a matter of choice.
Acknowledgments: We would like here to express our gratitude to Kevin H.
Knuth, whose kind and patient feedback led us to our consistency proof of Bernoulli’s
utility function and to Kevin M. Vanslette, whose simple but highly effective
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Appendix A. Deriving the Sum of the Lower and Upper Confidence
Bound Measure
Now, the confidence bounds of (4.2), say:
[LB(u|D1) , UB(u|D1)] , [LB(u|D2) , UB(u|D2)] , (A.1)
may provide us with a numerical handle on the concept of more-to-the-right.
For example, if we have that both
LB(u|D1) > LB(u|D2) , UB(u|D1) > UB(u|D2) . (A.2)
Then we will have an unambiguous preference for decision D1 over decision D2;
seeing that under both the still probable worst and best case we will be better if
we opt for D1.
Likewise, if we have that either
LB(u|D1) = LB(u|D2) , UB(u|D1) > UB(u|D2) , (A.3)
or
LB(u|D1) > LB(u|D2) , UB(u|D1) = UB(u|D2) . (A.4)
Then, again, we will have an unambiguous preference for decision D1 over decision
D2. In the constellation (A.3), we stand, all other things being equal, to be better
of under the still probable best case scenario; while in the constellation (A.4), we
stand, all other things being equal, to be less worse of under the still probable worst
case scenario.
However, things become more ambiguous when, say, under decision D1, we have
to make a trade-off between either a gain in the upper bound and a loss in the lower
bound
LB(u|D1) < LB(u|D2) , UB(u|D1) > UB(u|D2) , (A.5)
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or a gain in the lower bound and a loss in the upper bound
LB(u|D1) > LB(u|D2) , UB(u|D1) < UB(u|D2) . (A.6)
We postulate here that a rational criterion of choice in the respective trade-off
situations (A.5) and (A.6), would be to pick that decision whose gain in either the
lower or upper bound exceeds the loss in the corresponding upper or lower bound.
So, if, say, under D1 we stand to gain more in the still probable best case scenario
than we stand to lose under the still probable worst case scenario, that is, (A.5):
LB(u|D2)− LB(u|D1) < UB(u|D1)− UB(u|D2) , (A.7)
then we will choose D1 over D2. Likewise, if under D1 we stand to gain more in
the still probable worst case scenario than we stand to lose under the still probable
best case scenario, that is, (A.6):
LB(u|D1)− LB(u|D2) > UB(u|D2)− UB(u|D1) , (A.8)
then again we will choose D1 over D2.
Note that the gains and losses in this discussion pertain to gains and losses
on the utility dimension, not on the monetary outcome dimension. On the utility
dimension the phenomenon of loss aversion, that is, the phenomenon that monetary
losses may weigh heavier than equal monetary gains, has already been accounted
for. Stated differently, the utility scale is a linear loss-aversion corrected scale for
the moral value of monies.
Now, if we look at the scenarios (A.5) and (A.6), and the corresponding postu-
lated rational, because intuitive, criteria of choice (A.7) and (A.8), then we see that
we will choose D1 over D2 whenever we have that
LB(u|D1) + UB(u|D1) > LB(u|D2) + UB(u|D2) . (A.9)
Moreover, this single criterion of choice is also consistent with the choosing of D1
over D2 in the scenarios (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4).
Note that if the decision inequality (A.9) goes to an equality:
LB(u|D1) + UB(u|D1) = LB(u|D2) + UB(u|D2) . (A.10)
Then we have that we will be undecided when it comes to the decisions D1 and D2.
Now, the k-sigma bounds in (A.1) translate to
[E(u|Di)− k std(u|Di) , E(u|Di) + k std(u|Di)] , (A.11)
for i = 1, 2, which, if substituted in (A.9), give the inequality
2E(u|D1) > 2E(u|D2) , (A.12)
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which brings us right back to Bernoulli’s expected utility theory, as proposed in
1738, in which it is proposed that we choose that decision which maximizes the
expectation value of the utility probability distributions [1].
Nonetheless, the criterion of choice, that the sum of the upper and lower bound
should be maximized, as proposed here, will deviate from Bernoulli’s initial 1738
proposal when the k-sigma intervals overshoot either the minimal or the maximal
value of the utility probability distributions, or both.
Let a and b, respectively, be the minimal and maximal values of a given utility
probability distribution. Then we may identify three additional cases, relative to
(A.12):
LB∗(u) + UB∗(u) =


2 E(u) , LB(u) ≥ a, UB(u) ≤ b
a+ UB(u) , LB(u) < a, UB(u) ≤ b
LB(u) + b, LB(u) ≥ a, UB(u) > b
a+ b, LB(u) < a, UB(u) > b
(A.13)
These additional cases correspond, respectively, to scenarios where the k-sigma
intervals (A.11) either undershoot, or overshoot, or both undershoot and overshoot
the minimal and maximal values of a given utility probability distribution.
In the case of a lower confidence bound undershoot (e.g cases two and four) a
too pessimistic worst case scenario is in play, and in the case of an upper confidence
bound overshoot a too optimistic a best case scenario is in play, which is why we
have to readjust these confidence bounds by replacing them with more realistic
worst and best case scenarios (e.g the minimal and maximal values, a and b, of a
given utility probability distribution).
It may be readily seen that any scalar multiple of (A.13) will retain the transitive
ordering of the criterion of choice (A.13). Now, if we take as our scalar multiple
c = 1/2, then our criterion of choice may be interpreted as a location measure of
utility probability distribution:
LB∗(u) + UB∗(u)
2
=


E(u) , LB(u) ≥ a, UB(u) ≤ b
a+UB(u)
2 , LB(u) < a, UB(u) ≤ b
LB(u)+b
2 , LB(u) ≥ a, UB(u) > b
a+b
2 , LB(u) < a, UB(u) > b
(A.14)
where we note that the first case of (A.14) corresponds with Bernoulli’s expected
utility theory criterion of choice, whereas the fourth case corresponds with Hurwitz’s
criterion of choice with a balanced pessimism coefficient of α = 1/2.
Note also that we have an added degree of freedom in our decision theory in that
we may put an explicit premium on either caution or opportunity. For example, in
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the absence of lower bound undershoot and upper bound overshoot, we have as the
lower and upper bounds whose sum is to be maximized:
LB∗(u) = E(u)− k1 std(u) , (A.15)
and
UB∗(u) = E(u) + k2 std(u) . (A.16)
Then (A.15) and (A.16) sum to:
LB∗(u) + UB∗(u) = 2 E(u) + (k2 − k1) std(u) . (A.17)
If in (A.17) we let k1 > k2, then we put a premium caution; alternatively, if we set
k2 > k1, then we put a premium on opportunity; and if we let k1 = k2, then we
have an equal trade-off between caution and opportunity taking, (A.13).
